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Many problems in relation with the organisation of society revolve around
giving right incentives to people so that their individual interests are in line
with the general interest. The "invisible hand" generally fails to produce a
Pareto optimal organisation of economic activities in the presence of public
goods: since agents can bene￿t from others￿ contributions to such goods
without contributing themselves, individually rational decisions generally fall
short of Pareto optimal levels, a phenomenon referred to as the free-rider
problem.
The free-rider problem has come to be viewed as the canonical repres-
entation of collective action problems. Environmental issues like pollution
reduction and biodiversity protection oﬀer only but two examples from many
such issues, that can be found in other ￿elds like public economics, macro-
economics, international economics... This has created a great deal of interest
among social scientists, who have put much eﬀort to increase our knowledge
of the problem. Later on, they have also reacted by engineering theoretical
mechanisms to restore Pareto optimality. Meanwhile, laboratory experiments
have continuously provided a precious help in testing theories, and achiev-
ing a better understanding of both free-rider behaviour and the eﬃciency of
suggested solutions.
The goal of this paper is to discuss, from an experimental point of view,
the relative merits, or weaknesses, of two simple mechanisms proposed in
the theoretical literature to solve the free-rider problem in public goods situ-
ations. One mechanism rewards and penalizes deviations from the average
contribution of the other agents to the public good: this is the tax-subsidy
mechanism proposed by Falkinger (1996). The other one introduces a pre-
play stage where agents contemplate the possibility to oﬀer subsidies to one
another before contributions are decided: this two-stage mechanism is re-
ferred to as the compensation mechanism (see Varian (1994a, 1994b), who
himself builds on earlier works of Guttman (1978, 1985, 1987), Moore and
Repullo (1988), Danziger and Schnytzer (1991)).
Focusing on those two mechanisms is interesting for a number or reas-
ons. Firstly, within the set of existing theoretical mechanisms they share
the merit of simplicity and are, therefore, more likely to be applied in real
life situations. Secondly they produce supermodular or near supermodular
games, a technical property which is theoretically suﬃcient to ensure con-
vergence to Nash equilibria under a wide set of learning dynamics. This is
important, for real subjects are bounded rational agents, who generally start
2somewhere oﬀ the equilibrium path and who do not necessarily converge to
it. Existing laboratory experiments somehow con￿rm the relevance of the
supermodularity property for convergence (see Chen (2003) for a systematic
study of this topic). Thirdly, those two mechanisms rest on two diﬀerent
(some would even say opposite) views of the public sector intervention. The
tax-subsidy mechanism, could be called a ￿coercion￿ solution since, once in
place, agents cannot escape it, and can no longer enjoy the same level of
utility by keeping unchanged their behaviours. Also, it assumes a higher de-
gree of involvement of the public authorities than usually required by market
institutions. By contrast, the compensation mechanism could be termed a
￿liberal￿ solution: it does respect the agents￿ freedom of choice as agents
can escape the mechanism; keeping unchanged their behaviours won￿t re-
duce their utility levels. But former actions are no longer in equilibrium. It
is also less demanding as far as public authorities involvement is concerned.
It is more coasian in spirit for it requires the minimal state interventions
to protect property rights and to guaranty enforceability of agents￿ agree-
ments. With this coercion/liberal distinction, we have in mind something
more precise than a general philosophic remark. Recent experimental and
￿eld evidences observe that externally imposed rules tend to "crowd out"
endogenous cooperative behaviors (see Ostrom (2000) pp 147-148, and the
references therein). Social norms like trust, fairness and reciprocity might
explain the persistent propensity of subjects to cooperate, at least partially.
In the presence of a strongly coercive mechanism, there is no need for internal
norms to develop and sustain cooperation. But with a weak external rule, it
seems that the formation of social norms is deterred while the temptations
to deviate from cooperation become more seducing, possibly resulting in the
worst scenario. To the extent that the liberal solution could be considered a
weak external rule, one would expect it to be less eﬃcient than the coercion
solution.
In the simple framework we have chosen for the experiment, neglecting
convergence issues, those two mechanisms theoretically produce (roughly)
the same outcome. The next step is to check how well they perform with
real subjects. They have already been separately tested in laboratory into
two diﬀerent contexts. Overall, those two simple solutions have surpris-
ingly good performances, in comparison with other theoretical mechanisms
already tested1. Andreoni and Varian (1999) have assessed the merits of the
compensation mechanism in a prisoners￿ dilemma experiment. Without the
1Experimental papers report disappointing performances for Groves-Clarke, Groves-
Ledyard and the Walker mechanisms (see respectively Attiyeh et al (1999), Harstad and
Marrese (1981, 1982), Chen and Plott (1996), and Chen and Tang (1998).
3mechanism, only one third of the subjects chose to cooperate. The introduc-
tion of the subsidy stage increased cooperation from one third to two thirds.
Falkinger et al (2000) studied the impact of the tax-subsidy mechanism in
several public good environments, varying group size and payoﬀ functions.
They report that the mechanism causes an immediate and large shift toward
the eﬃcient level of public good. They also report that the Nash equilibrium
is an unusually good predictor for behaviours under the mechanism.
The originality of our paper is twofold. First it is to apply the com-
pensation mechanism in a public good framework with interior dominant
strategies, which despite its simplicity is a bit more complicated than the
prisoners￿ dilemma game used in Andreoni and Varian (1999). Second it is
to oﬀer the possibility to compare, from an empirical point of view, the two
mechanisms, by running them in the same framework. Our ￿ndings are as
follows: i) we con￿rm Falkinger et al. result, with diﬀerent subjects and
ad i ﬀerent group composition; in particular, the starting levels of contribu-
tions are unusually high, ii) both mechanisms lead to an increase in the levels
of contributions to the public good, iii) the tax-subsidy mechanism allows
for surprisingly good point and interval predictions of the average levels of
contribution; however the compensation mechanism allows for less reliable
predictions of the average levels of contributions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
public good economy we have reproduced in the laboratory; it also introduces
the two mechanisms. The experimental design is discussed in Section 3, and
empirical results are oﬀered in Section 4. Section 5 discusses and summarizes
these results.
2 A public good experiment with quadratic
utility
The economic situation reproduced in the laboratory is as follows. Two
agents i =1 ,2 a r ee n d o w e dw i t ha ne x o g e n o u si n c o m eyi,w h i c ht h e yc a n
divide between the consumption ci of a composite private good, and a contri-
bution gi to the production of a public good G. The production technology
for the public good takes the simplest form : G = g1 + g2. While ci is en-
joyed by agent i only, the public good nature of G means that both agents
bene￿tf r o mi t .T h u sa g e n ti￿s preferences are typically represented by utility
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i + G, M i,N i > 0,i =1 ,2.
Note that those functions Ui are concave, increasing in pubic good consump-
tion, and for ci ∈ [0,M i/Ni] they are non decreasing in private good con-
sumption as well. This choice of functions gives us the simplest framework
consistent with the questions we want to challenge2.
The reasons for this particular choice of utility functions are twofold. First
of all there is a need to keep the framework as simple as possible to ensure
that experimental subjects will get a good (and fast) understanding of the
link between the pro￿le of decisions and their monetary earnings. Secondly
the chosen framework must be relevant with respect to those theoretical prop-
erties of the two mechanisms we want to test experimentally, namely their
ability to oﬀer the subjects the correct incentives to take eﬃcient decisions
without requiring any knowledge of their preferences.
Varian￿s mechanism can be applied to a large set of situations, including
those for which Falkinger￿s mechanism has been designed; logically we are
therefore limited only by the requirements of Falkinger￿s mechanism. Most
of the public good games used for experiments are games with linear payoﬀs,
i.e. the simplest conceivable framework, where corner decisions are dominant
strategies. Falkinger￿s mechanism can be applied to such games3,b u ti tt h e n
requires that the designer knows the agents￿ preferences. If the ambition is to
challenge asymmetric information issues where the designer ignores agents￿
preferences, the mechanism does not have any relative advantage over more
traditional pigovian tax / subsidy schemes, except in public good frameworks
where agents undertake interior decisions, i.e. strictly positive contributions
gi. Only then the mechanism can Nash implement an allocation arbitrarily
close to eﬃciency with the requirement that the regulator knows only the
number of agents involved in the problem, and not their preferences.
With quasi-linear quadratic utility functions, the Nash equilibrium is
made of interior contributions. An additional advantage of the chosen fam-
2As of March 2004, only four published articles have used this speci￿c quadratic frame-
work with interior dominant strategies for the purpose of experimentation. They are Sefton
and Steinberg (1996), Keser (1996), Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999), and Falkinger et al
(2000).
3Actually it has been applied to public good games with linear payoﬀsi nt h e￿rst part
of Falkinger et al (2000).
5ily is that the marginal utility from public good consumption is constant ;
as we shall see in the next section, the resulting Nash equilibrium involves
dominant strategies, therefore subject are more likely to calculate accurately
the equilibrium strategies (before the introduction of any mechanism).
2.1 The free-rider problem
How much will the agents contribute to the public good on a voluntary basis?
To answer this question , theorists view the non cooperative decisions as a
Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent optimizes her utility, taking as given
the other agents￿ decisions. Formally, under this behavioural assumption,
each agent￿s problem reads as:
max





ci + gi = yi
G = gi + gj ,g j given,




c =1 . For our quadratic
example, the ￿rst order conditions of the two agents are:
−M1 + N1 (y1 − g1)+1=0
−M2 + N2 (y2 − g2)+1=0










































By contrast, Samuelson￿s conditions for eﬃciency requires MRS1+MRS2 =




Mi − Nici =1, P




M1 − N1c1 + M2 − N2c2 =( M1 − N1c1)(M2 − N2c2) ,
c1 + c2 + G = y1 + y2.
Samuelson￿s conditions diﬀer from the Nash equilibrium conditions, mean-
ing that the Nash equilibrium is generally not Pareto optimal.
62.2 Nash implementation with well-informed agents
This section describes two simple theoretical mechanisms designed to Nash-
implement Pareto optimal decisions in informational frameworks where agents
know each other preferences, but of course the designer does not.
2.2.1 Tax-subsidy mechanism
This mechanism modi￿es each agent￿s budget constraint by rewarding (penal-
izing) contributions over (under) the mean of the other agents￿ contributions.
To do so, the designer needs to choose a single parameter: a tax-subsidy rate
β. Under this new institutional framework, the problem of a typical agent
becomes:
max





ci + gi = yi + β (gi − gj) ,β ≥ 0
G = gi + gj
Note that this mechanism is necessarily balanced, whatever the contribution
decisions, since what an agent receives corresponds exactly to what the other
agent pays. The ￿rst order conditions for interior solutions are:
(β − 1)M1 − (β − 1)N1 [y1 − g1 + β (g1 − g2)] + 1 = 0 ,
(β − 1)M2 − (β − 1)N2 [y2 − g2 + β (g2 − g1)] + 1 = 0 .
Solving this system one ￿nds a solution for G and ci con￿gured by β.T h e
nice feature of this mechanism is that, with a value for β arbitrarily close
to n−1
n =1 /2, the resulting equilibrium will be arbitrarily close to eﬃciency.














Those equilibrium quantities ful￿ll Samuelson￿s conditions for eﬃciency stated



























There exists diﬀerent versions of the compensation mechanism in the liter-
ature. They all are two-stage mechanism, and the one we use is as follows.
First, agents voluntarily oﬀer a subsidy to the other agents￿ contributions.
Then, given this pro￿le of subsidies, agents contribute to the public good.
It is very similar to the mechanism suggested by Danziger and Schnytzer
(1991). More sophisticated forms of this mechanism add penalization terms
(see Varian (1994a)), which are ignored here. A subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium is found by solving this game backward. Formally:
￿ The maximization program in the second stage is:
max





ci +( 1− sj)gi = yi − sigj
G = gi + gj
This leads to the ￿rst order condition: MRSi ≤ (1 − sj),i=1 ,2.I t
is worth noting that adding up the two individual budget constraints,
whatever the decisions as for the contributions and the subsidies, one
has: ci + cj + gi + gj = yi + yj; this means that this form of the
mechanism meets the balanced budget requirement, both at and oﬀ
the equilibrium. Let s =( s1,s 2) stands for the pro￿le of subsidies, and











Danziger and Schnytzer (1991), and Varian (1994) have established that,
under reasonable assumptions, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for pub-
lic good games with a subsidy stage replicates a Lindahl equilibrium. In
symmetric games, this means that si = sj =1 /2. In our symmetric game,
this further means that ci = cj =3 0 ,g i = gj =2 0 .
3 Experimental design
As already mentioned, the compensation mechanism and the tax-subsidy
mechanism have been tested in laboratory experiments in two diﬀerent con-
8Table 1: Experimental design
Falkinger 2000 BFR 2004
Group size n 4 2
Parameter M 5 5
Parameter N .1 .1



















cF 20 35 31
gF 30 15 19
GF 120 30 38
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9texts. Here we want to apply the two mechanisms to the same context in
order to compare their performance.
In the setting of a public good game, both the tax-subsidy and the com-
pensation mechanism act on the budget constraint. We recall that in the
voluntary provision game the budget constraint is:
ci = yi − gi (2)
In the tax-subsidy mechanism the budget constraint is:
ci = yi − gi + β(gi − gj) (3)
and in the compensation mechanism it is :
ci = yi − gi + sjgi − sigj (4)
So we can express the diﬀerence among these three situations in terms of
how ci, the contribution to the private good, is calculated.
This aspect made the design of the two experiments we ran to investigate
the performance of the two mechanims quite straightforward, as we could
keep the same instructions, applying changes only for the way the contribu-
tion to the private good was calculated. This facilitated both communication
to the subjects and their understanding of the consequences of their choice
in the two treatments they played4.
Falkinger et al. (2000) test the practical tractability and eﬀectiveness of
the Falkinger mechanism in the same kind of quadratic games, but with dif-
ferent group size, diﬀerent preferences and diﬀerent tax-subsidy parameters.
Table 1 describes both the experimental game used by Falkinger et al. (2000)
-t h i si sr e f e r r e dt oa sC4 and M4 in their paper - and our modi￿cation. We
consider the same parameters for the payoﬀ function, but we deal with only
one group size, namely two players. We consider two diﬀerent values for the
parameter β, as we explain more in detail in what follows.
In each experiment participants play two games: a control game, with no
mechanism for twenty rounds, and a second game with either mechanism for
other twenty rounds.
Thirty subjects took part in the experiment on the compensation mech-
anism and ￿fty-four subjects took part in the experiment on the tax-subsidy
4The set of instructions for the tax subsidy game with β = 9
19 is included in the
Appendix. The full set of instructions is available from the authors upon request.
10mechanism (thirty subjects with a parameter β = 9
19 and twenty-four sub-
jects with β = 1
3). We conducted three sessions of each experiment.
Participants were divided into groups with two members each and were
informed that they would play against the same opponent in the experiment
but would never learn with whom they formed a group. The instructions
were read aloud to subjects, who, before playing the game at the computer,
had to ￿ll in a questionnaire to check their understanding of the instructions.
Each participant received 50 points as initial endowment and had to de-
cide how to allocate this initial endowment between two activities, one bene-
￿cial to both players in the same group (activity A) and the other bene￿cial
only to the donor (activity B). Their decision would have consequences in
terms of income earned from both activities. Income from activity A would
result from the sum of both group members￿ contributions to A, whereas
income from activity B would result from the following formula:







Subjects did not need to do any calculations as they were provided with a
table listing the level of income from activity B corresponding to any possible
value of the contribution to B that the subject could make, from zero to 50.
The table also listed the income change if activity B increased by one unit
and the income change if activity A increased by one unit, in order to make
clear how income changed after an additional unit of contribution to either
activity.
Total income would result from the sum of income from activity B and
income from activity A. This would give each subject a payoﬀ which is derived








i + G (6)
with Mi = M =5 ,a n dNi = N =0 .1.
The total points scored at the end of each experiment were converted into
pounds and added to the fee of £ 2.50 which each participant received for
showing up. The average payment was £ 10.00. Each experiment lasted two
hours.
11T h es o f t w a r ez - t r e eh a sb e e nu s e df o rp r o g r a m m i n gt h ee x p e r i m e n t s .
In the two experiments the payoﬀ was the same for all the subjects in
both treatments. The only change between the control treatment and the
mechanism treatments was the way we calculated the total contribution to
activity B.
In the control game subjects were asked to decide how many points they
wanted to contribute to activity A. Their choice would automatically de-
termine the contribution to B, and income from both activities would be
calculated by the software. At the end of each period subjects were informed
about the contribution of the other group member to activity A, their in-
come from activity A and their income from activity B. From a theoretical
point of view, subjects participate to a 20-round repeated game of com-
plete information, where the stage game admits a unique Nash equilibrium
(gi,c i)=( 1 0 ,40), and where the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
total game is made of 20 repetitions of the static Nash equilibrium.
In the tax-subsidy game we varied the value of the mechanism parameter
β. We set it to a value below the optimal level β
∗ = 1
2, that otherwise would
have given multiple solutions to the game. From many voluntary contribution
experiments we know that subjects, on average, overcontribute relative to the
predicted equilibrium, so we were con￿dent of staying in the predicted equi-
librium despite a slightly lower reward/penalty for any discrepancy between
players￿ contribution to the public good. We tried two diﬀerent values, and
￿rst set β equal to 1
3 a n dt h e nt o 9
19, a value closer to the optimal one.
The only diﬀerence between the control game and the mechanism game
was the way the contribution to activity B was calculated. In the tax-subsidy
game the contribution to activity B was split into a direct contribution and
an indirect contribution. The direct contribution was as in the control group,
corresponding to what remained of the initial endowment after the subject
had decided how many points to allocate to activity A. This would be repres-
ented by yi−gi in expression (3) The indirect contribution was the diﬀerence
between the two group members￿ contribution to activity A multiplied by 1
3
or 9
19, which would correspond to β(gi−gj) in expression (3). The same table
as in the control game could be used to work out the income from activity
B for each level of the (total) contribution to B.
Theoretically, this is again a repeated game of complete information,
where the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the repetition of the unique
12static Nash equilibrium, i.e. (ci,g i)=( 1 5 ,35) for β equal to1
3 and (ci,g i)=
(19,31) for β equal to 9
19 .
In the compensation mechanism treatment, subjects were given the option
to oﬀer a rate at which to support the other group member in order to
encourage him to contribute to activity A. Once players had decided on the
rate of support they had to choose how many points to allocate to activity
A. In this mechanism treatment the total contribution to activity B was
split into a direct contribution and the diﬀerence between the other group
member￿s contribution to one￿s activity B and one￿s own contribution to the
other group member￿s activity B. As before, the direct contribution was what
remained of the initial endowment once the subjects had decided how many
points to allocate to activity A. This would correspond to the term yi − gi
in equation (4). The other group member￿s contribution to one￿s activity B
was calculated by multiplying the rate at which the other group member was
willing to support his opponent times his opponent￿s contribution to activity
A. This corresponds to the term sjgi in equation (4). One￿s contribution to
the other group member￿s activity B was calculated by multiplying one￿s rate
of support times the other group member￿s contribution to activity A. This
corresponds to the term sigj in equation (4). As in the previous experiment
the same table as in the control game could be used to work out the income
from activity B for each level of the (total) contribution to B.
A subgame perfect equilibrium of each two-stage game is a contribution
of 20 to activity A and 30 to activity B, (gi,c i)=( 2 0 ,30). And a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium over the 20 rounds is the repetition of this two-stage
equilibrium.
In the following section we examine the impact of the mechanisms by
comparing the observed behaviour over time in the Control and in the Treat-
ment.
4 Experimental results of the two experiments
This section evaluates the eﬀectiveness of both incentive schemes. We oﬀer
descriptive statistics of the contributions to the public good, results of tests
on the eﬀects of the treatments, and we show plots of time series of contri-
butions. Throughout this section, the reported statistic is the ￿contribution
to the public good by pairs of subjects￿.
134.1 Contributions to the public good
Table 2 reports on the descriptive statistic ￿average sum of contributions￿,
for both parts of each experiment. Data from play of the game by the pairs
of subjects are organized into blocks of ￿ve rounds. In each control of each
experiment, the levels of contributions are high. Subjects start at a very
high level, close to the Pareto eﬃcient level of 40, and although play moves
towards Nash equilibrium, there is still substantial overcontribution after a
few rounds of play. In the last ￿ve rounds, the observed average level is about
20% higher than predicted by theory.
As for the treatment sessions:
1. There is a rapid, large shift in the level of contributions after the mech-
anisms are introduced. The tax-subsidy mechanism with β = 1
3 pro-
duces a jump from around 25 in the last ￿ve rounds of the control to
around 38 in the ￿rst ￿ve rounds of the treatment. With β = 9
19,t h e
mechanism increases the level from 23 in the last ￿ve rounds of the
control to around 52 of the ￿rst ￿ve rounds of the treatment. For the
compensation mechanism, there is a jump from around 24 to around
37.
2. For all blocks, the contributions are higher under the tax-subsidy treat-
ment with high value of β than under the compensation treatment.
3. For the last three blocks, the contributions are higher under the com-
pensation treatment than under the tax-subsidy treatment with low
value of β, which itself is characterized by higher contributions than
under the control.
4. The sum of contributions under the tax-subsidy mechanism is predicted
accurately, after some adjustment,
5. whereas the sum of contributions under the compensation mechanism
is predicted inaccurately, even after some adjustment.
4.2 Average contribution and con￿dence bounds over
time
Figures 1, 2 and 3 report the time series of the contributions. The ￿gures
show the sum of contributions to the public good averaged over either all
control groups or all treatment groups. In addition to the average of the
14Table 2: Experimental results: Sum of contributions
Experiment 1a Experiment 1b Experiment 2
Control Tax-Subsidy Control Tax-Subsidy Control Compen-
β = 1
3 β = 9
19 sation
Nash 20 30 20 38 20 40
Pareto 40
Rounds 1-5 35.50 38.37 36.48 52.21 35.65 37.07
Rounds 6-10 29.58 30.88 27.99 47.05 30.51 34.13
Rounds 11-15 27.18 30.37 24.83 42.75 29.16 31.75
Rounds 16-20 25.13 29.00 23.03 38.97 24.36 31.65
sum of contributions, the ￿gures show the 95% con￿dence interval bounds
for the average group sums. To calculate the con￿dence intervals, we used
the method of bootstrapping (with N = 1000).
We observe movement towards Nash equilibrium under all controls, fast
convergence to equilibrium under the treatment with tax-subsidy parameter
β = 1
3 and slower convergence to equilibrium under the treatment with β =
9
19. In contrast, we do not observe movement towards the predicted value



































Figure 1: Sum of contributions and con￿dence bounds; Control and Tax



































Figure 2: Sum of contributions and con￿dence bounds; Control and Tax-



































Figure 3: Sum of contributions and con￿dence bounds; Control and Com-
pensation mechanism.
184.3 Nonparametric tests
This subsection ￿rst compares the contributions under the controls in exper-
iments 1a and 1b with the contributions under the control in experiment 2.
We conclude that the contributions are similar in the experiments. Then, we
assess the eﬀect of each treatment. That is, we compare the contributions
under the control with the contributions under the corresponding treatment.
Lastly, we compare the contributions under both treatments.
Do we observe similar levels of contributions in the controls? The average
sum of contributions in control sessions from experiments 1a and 1b are 29.35
and 28.08, respectively. The average sum of contributions in experiment 2 is
29.92. We use a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. The
null hypothesis is that the median of the diﬀerence of the average sum of
contributions under the control in experiments 1a and 1b, denoted ﬂ GN
1 ,a n d
the average sum of contributions under the control in experiment 2, denoted
ﬂ GN
2 ,i sz e r o 5.
The results show that the medians are not statistically diﬀerent at any
level below .59 (with low value of β)a n db e l o w0.18 (with high value of β).
We conclude that there is no diﬀerence between either control of experiment
1 and the control of experiment 26.
Above, the unit of observation was the average of the sum of contribu-
tions. That is, with twenty rounds, we calculate twenty statistics i.e. twenty
average sums of contributions. Now, let the unit of observation be the sum
of contributions of each pair. For instance, with twenty rounds and twelve
pairs, we calculate two hundred forty statistics i.e. two hundred forty sums of
contributions7. With the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney)
test, ￿rst, we ￿nd that [Prob>|z|]=.28 when we compare the control of
experiment 1 with low value of β with the control of experiment 2; second,
we ￿nd that [Prob>|z|]=.05 when we compare the control of experiment
1 with high value of β with the control of experiment 2 and, ￿nally, we ￿nd
that [Prob>|z|]=.24 when we compare the controls of experiment 1. We
con￿rm our ￿ndings and we conclude that there is no diﬀerence between the
controls.
5The test use as inputs ﬂ GN
1 , the contributions summed over all pairs for each round t =
1,2,...,20 and ﬂ GN
2 , the contributions summed over all pairs for each round t =1 ,2,...,20.
6The medians of the controls of experiment 1 are not statistically diﬀerent at any level
below 0.29. There is no diﬀerence between those controls, too.
7The test use as inputs GN
1 of each pair for each round t =1 ,2,...,20 and GN
2 of each
pair for each round t =1 ,2,...,20.
194.3.1 Does the tax-subsidy mechanism change agents￿ behavior?
For the chosen value of the tax-subsidy parameter β = 1
3, theory predicts a
level of the public good equal to 30. The sum of contributions averaged over
twelve pairs and twenty rounds is 31.63.I nt h el a s t￿ve rounds, the average
sum of contributions is 29.00. The median average sum of contributions in
the last ￿ve rounds is 29.33. We conclude that the observations are very close
to equilibrium.
Does the treatment (with β = 1
3) signi￿cantly increase the level of contri-
butions? First, we use a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. The null hypothesis is
that the median of the diﬀerence of the average sum of contributions under
the control, denoted ﬂ GN
1 , and the average sum of contributions under the
treatment, denoted ﬂ GF,i sz e r o 8. The null hypothesis can be rejected at any
level below .09. We conclude that there is a signi￿cant diﬀerence between
control and treatment over all rounds.
Second, we use a bootstrap test9. The null hypothesis is that the level of
the public good is identical in the control and the treatment sessions. Using
a 5 % level of signi￿cance, we can reject the hypothesis on data from rounds
11-15 and data from rounds 16-20. More precisely, from the resulting data:
￿ in rounds 1 − 5, the diﬀerence diﬀerence between the contributions in
the treatment and the contribution in the control is 2.87,w i t hab i a s
of .02, a standard error of 1.62 and a 95% con￿dence interval of [−.31
6.04].
￿ in rounds 6 − 10, the diﬀerence in contributions is 1.30,w i t hab i a so f
−.10, a standard error of 1.58 and a 95% con￿dence interval of [−1.80
4.40].
￿ in rounds 11−15,t h ed i ﬀerence in contributions is 3.18, with a bias of
.00, a standard error of 1.42 and a 95% con￿dence interval of [.39 5.97].
￿ ￿nally, in rounds 16 − 20, the diﬀerence in contributions is 3.87,w i t h
ab i a so f−.02, a standard error of 1.53 and a 95% con￿dence interval
of [.86 6.87].
8The test use as inputs ﬂ GN
1 , the contributions summed over all pairs for each round t =
1,2,...,20 and ﬂ GF, the contributions summed over all pairs for each round t =1 ,2,...,20.
9The test use as inputs GN
1 of each pair and GF of each pair for rounds t =1 ,2,...,5
(or t =6− 10 or t =1 1− 15 or t =1 6− 20).
20We conclude that there is a signi￿cant diﬀerence between control and
treatment in the last ten rounds.
When the tax-subsidy parameter β equals 9
19, theory predicts a level of
the public good equal to 38. The sum of contributions averaged over ￿fteen
pairs and twenty rounds is 45.25.I n t h e l a s t ￿ve rounds, the average sum
of contributions is 38.97. The median average sum of contributions in the
last ￿ve rounds is 38.13. We conclude that the observations are close to
equilibrium.
Does the treatment (with β = 9
19) signi￿cantly increase the level of contri-
butions? First, we use a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. The null hypothesis is
that the median of the diﬀerence of the average sum of contributions under
the control, denoted ﬂ GN
1 , and the average sum of contributions under the
treatment, denoted ﬂ GF,i sz e r o 10. The null hypothesis can be rejected at any
reasonable level (Prob>|z| = .00). We conclude that there is a signi￿cant
diﬀerence between control and treatment over all rounds.
Second, we use a bootstrap test11. The null hypothesis is that the level
of the public good is identical in the control and the treatment sessions.
￿ in rounds 1 − 5,t h ed i ﬀerence between the contributions in the treat-
ment and the contribution in the control is 15.73,w i t hab i a so f.21,a
standard error of 2.86 and a 95% con￿dence interval of [10.12 21.35].
￿ In rounds 6−10, the diﬀerence in contributions is 19.07,w i t hab i a so f
.075, a standard error of 2.60 and a 95% con￿dence interval of [13.97
24.16].
￿ In rounds 11−15, the diﬀerence in contributions is 17.92,w i t hab i a so f
−.03, a standard error of 2.40 and a 95% con￿dence interval of [13.21
22.63].
￿ Lastly, in rounds 16− 20, the diﬀerence in contributions is 15.95,w i t h
ab i a so f.064, a standard error of 1.95 and a 95% con￿dence interval
of [12.11 19.78].
Hence, using a 5% level of signi￿cance, we can reject the hypothesis on
data from rounds 1 − 5, 6 − 10, 11 − 15 and 16 − 20.
10The test use as inputs ﬂ GN
1 , the contributions summed over all pairs for each round t =
1,2,...,20 and ﬂ GF, the contributions summed over all pairs for each round t =1 ,2,...,20.
11The test use as inputs GN
1 of each pair and GF of each pair for rounds t =1 ,2,...,5
(or t =6− 10 or t =1 1− 15 or t =1 6− 20).
21We conclude that there is a signi￿cant diﬀerence between control and
treatment.
4.3.2 Does the compensation mechanism change agents￿ beha-
vior?
The predicted level of the public good is 40. The average sum of contributions
of ￿fteen pairs and twenty rounds is 33.97.I nt h el a s t￿ve rounds, the average
sum of contributions is 31.65 and the median average sum of contributions
is 33.73.
Does the treatment have an eﬀect? Again, using a Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test, the null hypothesis is that the median of the diﬀerence of the
average sum of contributions under the control ( ﬂ GN
2 ) and the average sum of
contributions under the treatment ( ﬂ GV) is zero12. The results indicate that
the medians are not statistically diﬀe r e n ta ta n yl e v e lb e l o w.22.O n t h i s
basis, one may conclude that there is only an insigni￿cant diﬀerence between
control and treatment over all rounds.
However, a bootstrap test13 with a 5% level of signi￿cance rejects the null
hypothesis that the level of the public good is the same under the control
and the treatment on data from the last ￿ve rounds. Speci￿cally, we ￿nd:
￿ in rounds 1 − 5, the diﬀerence in contributions is 1.41,w i t hab i a so f
−.22, a standard error of 2.36 and a 95% con￿dence interval of [−3.23
6.06].
￿ in rounds 6 − 10, the diﬀerence in contributions is 3.63,w i t hab i a so f
−.06, a standard error of 2.27 and a 95% con￿dence interval of [−.85
8.10].
￿ In rounds 11−15,t h ed i ﬀerence in contributions is 2.59,w i t hab i a so f
−.02, a standard error of 2.26 and a 95% con￿dence interval of [−1.85
7.02].
￿ A n di nr o u n d s16 − 20,t h ed i ﬀerence in contributions is 7.29,w i t ha
bias of −.07, a standard error of 2.11 and a 95% con￿dence interval of
[3.16 11.42].
Hence, we conclude that there is a signi￿cant diﬀerence between control
and treatment in the last ￿ve rounds.
12The test use as inputs ﬂ GN
2 , contributions summed over all pairs for each round t =
1,2,...,20 and ﬂ GV , contributions summed over all pairs for each round t =1 ,2,...,20.
13The test use as inputs ﬂ GN
1 of each pair and ﬂ GF of each pair for each round t =1 ,2,...,5
(or 6 − 10 or 11 − 15 or 16 − 20).
224.3.3 Do the two mechanisms have diﬀerent eﬀects?
Do we observe signi￿cantly diﬀerent levels of contributions in the two types
of treatments? The average sum of contributions in the experiment with tax-
subsidy parameters β = 1
3 and β = 9
19 are respectively 32.15 and 45.25.T h e
average sum of contributions in the experiment with compensation option is
33.65.
We use a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. The
null hypothesis is that the median of the diﬀerence of the average sum of
contributions under the tax-subsidy mechanism, denoted ﬂ GF, and the average
sum of contributions under compensation mechanism, denoted ﬂ GV,i sz e r o 14.
The medians of the tax-subsidy mechanism with low value of β and the
compensation mechanism are not statistically diﬀerent at any level below .27.
We conclude that there is only an insigni￿cant diﬀerence between treatments.
The medians of the tax-subsidy mechanism with high value of β and the
compensation mechanism are statistically diﬀerent at any reasonable level
([Prob > |z|]=.00). We conclude that there is diﬀerence between treat-
ments.
Above, the unit of observation was the average of the sum of contribu-
tions. That is, with twenty rounds, we calculate twenty statistics i.e. twenty
average sums of contributions. Now, let the unit of observation be the sum of
contributions of each pair. For instance, with twenty rounds and twelve pairs,
we calculate two hundred forty statistics i.e. two hundred forty sums of con-
tributions15. We use the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney)
test. When we compare the tax-subsidy mechanism with low value of β with
the compensation mechanism, we ￿nd [Prob>|z|]=.78.W h e n w e c o m -
pare the tax-subsidy mechanism with high value of β with the compensation
mechanism, we ￿nd [Prob>|z|]=.00.W ec o n ￿rm our ￿ndings and we con-
clude that there is no diﬀerence between the compensation mechanism and
the mechanism with low value of the tax-subsidy parameter whereas there is
ad i ﬀerence between the compensation mechanism and the mechanism with
high value of the tax-subsidy parameter.
14The test use as inputs ﬂ GF, contributions summed over all pairs for each round t =
1,2,...,20 and ﬂ GV , contributions summed over all pairs for each round t =1 ,2,...,20.
15The test use as inputs GF of each pair for each round t =1 ,2,...,20 and GV of each
pair for each round t =1 ,2,...,20.
234.4 Tentative explanations
Two main experimental ￿ndings surface, that ought to be explained: i) the
clear superiority of the tax-subsidy mechanism in its ability to promote co-
operation, ii) subjects￿ decisions converge to the predicted values in the tax-
subsidy treatment, whereas there is a lack of convergence under the com-
pensation treatment.
It is tempting to see the ￿rst phenomenon as a con￿rmation of the
"crowding out" eﬀect mentioned in the introduction, i.e. the compensa-
tion is less eﬃcient because it deters any role for social norms in favor of
cooperation, while substituting real but weak incentives to depart from free-
riding. It should also be mentioned that subjects in the laboratory found
the compensation mechanism environment harder to understand, even in this
highly stylised public good problem, and the diﬃculty to devise their optimal
strategy is a serious candidate for explaining the phenomenon. Besides, those
two explanations might be strongly related, in which case the superiority of
"coercion" solutions might be essentially due to their simplicity.
The relative lack of simplicity might also explain why the liberal solution
does not seem to converge. Another explanation has to do with the role
played by supermodularity properties in learning. Those properties theoret-
ically ensure convergence to the equilibrium under various learning dynamics
(see Chen (2003)). Experimentally it has been con￿rmed that modular or
near supermodular mechanism, like Falkinger mechanism16,h a v eg o o dc o n -
vergence properties. The absence or presence of the supermodularity prop-
erty for the public good game with the compensation mechanism is an open
question. The lack of convergence observed in the laboratory suggests that
this property might be lacking.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper investigates experimentally the relative performance of the tax-
subsidy mechanism over the compensation mechanism in a public good prob-
lem. To summarize, it provides experimental supportive evidence that: i) the
two mechanisms do change agents behaviours in the direction of increased
cooperation, ii) for a low value of the tax-subsidy parameter β =1 /3,t h e
changes resulting from the two mechanisms are not signi￿cantly diﬀerent,
iii) however, with a higher value β =9 /19, closer to the one required for
16Supermodularity would obtain for a value of β ≥ 1. See Chen (2000).
24eﬃciency, the mechanisms do have diﬀerent eﬀects, iv) furthermore, with
the tax-subsidy mechanism, theoretical predictions are more accurate and
there is convergence, whereas with the compensation mechanism variability
is important and convergence is problematic. Points ii), iii) and iv) make
a case in favour of the tax-subsidy mechanism: indeed, even with a choice
of β which is somehow below its "eﬃcient" level, the performance of the
mechanism in terms of promoting cooperation is comparable with that of
the compensation mechanism; besides the prediction under the tax-subsidy
treatment are more reliable.
The lack of convergence under the compensation treatment might be due
to a learning problem. This mechanism is relatively more complex than
the tax-subsidy mechanism: there are two decision variables, and backward
induction is required. In this respect, adding more rounds would be helpful.
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276 Appendix
Instructions for the tax-subsidy experiment
with beta = 9/19.
Instructions (Control)
You are now taking part in an experiment which has been ￿nanced by the
Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation at the Department
of Economics, University of Bristol. If you read the following instructions
carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount
of money in addition to the £2.50 you will received anyway. It is therefroe
very important that you read these instructions with care. At the end of the
experiment all earnings will be added and paid to you in cash.
During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in "Points".
At the end of the experiment the total amount of Points you have earned
will be converted to Pounds at the following rate:
100 Points = $ 0.125
In this experiment there are 12 participants, which are divided into 6
groups with 2 members each. Except us, i.e., the experimenters, no one
knows the group composition.
The experiment is divided into 20 periods. In each period you have to
make a decision that you have to enter into the computer. During these 20
periods the group composition stays the same. You are, therefore, remaining
w i t ht h es a m ep e o p l ei nag r o u pf o r20 periods, but you will never learn with
w h o my o uf o r m e dag r o u p .
The instructions which we have distributed to you, are solely for your
private information. It is prohibited to communicate with the other parti-
cipants during the experiment. Should you have any questions, please ask
us. If you violate this rule, we will have to exclude you from the experiment
and from all payments.
The following pages describe the course of the experiment in detail:
28At the beginning of each period each participant gets 50 points,w h i c h
in the following we call endowment. Your task is to make a decision how
to use your endowment. There are two activities for which you can use your
endowment: activity A and activity B. These activities result in diﬀerent
incomes which we will explain in more detail below.
At the beginning of each period the following screen will appear:
[Insert screen shot of decision screen, Control]
You have to decide how many points you want to contribute to activity
A by typing a number between 0 and 50 in the input ￿eld. This ￿eld can
be reached by clicking it with the mouse. As soon as you have decided how
many points to contribute to activity A, you have also decided how much
your contribution to activity B is, namely, (50 - your contribution to
activity A)p o i n t s .
The current period appears in the top left corner of the screen. In the top
right corner you can see how many more seconds remain for you to decide
on the distribution of your points. Your decision must be made before the
time displayed is 0 seconds. After you have inserted your contribution you
have to press the OK-button (with the help of the mouse). As soon as you
have pressed the OK-button you cannot revise your decision for the current
period anymore.
After all members of your group have made their decision, the following
income screen will appear.
[Insert screen shot of income screen 1, Control]
Besides the period and the remaining time for watching the income screen,
the income screen shows the following entries, which we will explain in detail
below.
1. Your contribution to activity A
2. Your income from activity A
3. Your contribution to activity B
4. Your income from activity B
5. Your total income in this period
29In the following we will explain these items in detail.
1 .Y o u rc o n t r i b u t i o nt oa c t i v i t yA :
Here your contribution to activity A as you have inserted it previously is
listed.
2. Your income from activity A:
Your income from activity A is your contribution to activity A plus the
other group member￿s contribution to activity A.
Income from activity A = sum of contributions of both group
members to activity A
The income of the other group member from activity A is calculated
according to the same formula, i.e., each group member has the same income
from activity A. If, for example, the sum of contributions of both group
members is 60 points, you and the other group member receive an income of
60 points from activity A. If both group members together invest 10 points
in activity A, you and the other group member each receive an income of 10
points.
Therefore, each point that you contribute to activity A, increases your
income by 1 point. However, this also increases the income of the other
group member by 1 point, such that the total income of the group increases
by 2 ￿ 1=2points. Hence, through your contribution to activity A
the other group member earns something. In turn, it also holds
that you earn something from the contribution of the other group
member.
3 .Y o u rc o n t r i b u t i o nt oa c t i v i t yB :
Your contribution to activity B is the diﬀerence between your endowment
of 50 points and your contribution to activity A:
Your contribution to activity B = 50 - contribution to activity
A
4. Your income from activity B:
An important diﬀerence between the contributions to activity A and
activity B is that from your contribution to activity A the other group mem-
ber earns something in the same way, whereas from your contribution to
30activity B only you earn something. In turn, it also holds that you earn in
the same way from the contribution of the other group member to activity
A, while you earn nothing from the contribution of the other group members
to activity B. The income of each group member from his contributions to
activity B is calculated according to the following formula:
Income from activity B = 5￿contribution to activity B
- ( 1
20)￿(contribution to activity B)2
The income from activity B will be calculated for both group members
according to the same formula. In the Table your income from activity
B is indicated for each level of your contribution to activity B. If your con-
tribution to activity B is 0, for example, then your income from activity B
is 0 (see Table). If your contribution is 25, then you will earn an income of
93.75 points from activity B (see Table). If your contribution is 50,t h e ny o u
will earn an income from activity B of 125.
Your income from activity B depends therefore on your contribution to
activity B. The other group member earns - in contrast to activity A - nothing
from your contribution to activity B.
In the enclosed Table not only your income from the contribution to
activity B is listed, but also the income change, if activity B increases
by 1 unit,a sw e l la st h eincome change, if activity A increases by
1 unit. As you see (and as already explained above under ￿Income from
activity A￿) your income from activity A increases always exactly by 1
unit for each additional point you or the other group member contributes to
activity A. The income change in activity B, however, is not constant. The
income change is smaller, the larger your contribution to activity B already
is. Therefore when your contribution to activity B is low (because your
contribution to activity A is high) an additional contribution to activity B
generates a relatively large additional income from activity B. If, in contrast,
your contribution to activity B is high (because your contribution to activity
A is low) an additional contribution to activity B generates a relatively low
additional income from activity B.
5. Your total income in a period:
The total income (in points) in a period is
Income from activity A + income from activity B
At the end of the experiment the total incomes of all periods will be added
up and exchanged into Pounds.
31Control questionnaire:
Please answer all questions. Their purpose is only to enhance your un-
derstanding. Please always write down the whole calculation. If you have
questions, please ask us!
1. Each group member is endowed with 50 points. Assume that nobody
(including you) contributes anything to activity A. What is
Your contribution to activity B? ..............
Your income from activity A? ..............
Your income from activity B? ..............
Your total income in this period? ..............
2. Assume that the other group member contributes nothing to activity
A. You contribute 10 points. What is
Your contribution to activity B? ..............
Your income from activity A? ..............
Your income from activity B? ..............
Your total income in this period? ..............
3. Each group member is endowed with 50 points. Assume that each group
member (including you) contributes 50 points to activity A. What is
Your contribution to activity B? ..............
Your income from activity A? ..............
Your income from activity B? ..............
Your total income in this period? ..............
4. Assume that the other group member contributes 50 points to activity
A. You contribute 40 points to activity A. What is
Your contribution to activity B? ..............
Your income from activity A? ..............
Your income from activity B? ..............
Your total income in this period? ..............
32Instructions (Falkinger)
We will repeat the experiment for 20 periods. There is one change that
concerns the calculation of the contribution to activity B. Your contribution
to activity B consists now of a direct contribution to activity B as well as
an INDIRECT contribution to activity B. The course of the experiment
is exactly the same as before.
As previously you have to determine in the decision screen your contribu-
tion to activity A. In each period, you have again 50 points at your disposal.
After you have made your decision, the following income screen will appear:
[Insert income screen, Falkinger]
On the income screen you can see the following entries which we will
e x p l a i ni nd e t a i lb e l o w .
1. Your contribution to activity A
2. Contribution of the OTHER group member to activity A
3. Your income from activity A
4. Your direct contribution to activity B
5. Your INDIRECT contribution to activity B
6. Your total contribution to activity B
7. Your income from activity B
8. Your total income in this period
In the following we will explain these items in detail.
1 .Y o u rc o n t r i b u t i o nt oa c t i v i t yA :
Here your contribution to activity A as you have inserted it previously is
listed.
2. Contribution of the OTHER group member to
activity A:
Here the contribution of the OTHER group member to activity A is listed.
33If you add the contribution of the OTHER group member to your con-
tribution to activity A, you will get the sum of contributions of both group
members to activity A.
3. Your income from activity A:
As previously, your income from activity A is your contribution to activity
A plus the other group member￿s contribution to activity A.
Income from activity A = sum of contributions of both group
members to activity A
Therefore, each point that you contribute to activity A, increases your
income by 1 point. However, this also increases the income of the other
group member by 1 point, such that the total income of the group increases
by 2 ￿ 1=2points. Hence, through your contribution to activity A
the other group member earns something. In turn, it also holds
that you earn something from the contribution of the other group
member to activity A.
4. Your direct contribution to activity B:
Your direct contribution to activity B is the diﬀerence between your en-
dowment of 50 points and your contribution to activity A:
Your contribution to activity B = 50 - contribution to activity
A
This direct contribution therefore corresponds to the contribution to
activity B in the previous experiment.
5. Your INDIRECT contribution to activity B:
Your indirect contribution is now the decisive change in the new experi-
ment. Your indirect contribution to activity B depends on the contribution
made by both you and your group member to activity A (!). The indirect
contribution is calculated as follows:
Your INDIRECT contribution to activity B = [Your contribu-
tion to activity A minus the contribution of the OTHER group
member to activity A]￿( 9
19)
For example, if you have contributed 21 points to activity A and the other
group member has contributed 40 points, then your indirect contribution is
34[21−40]￿ 9
19 = −19￿ 9
19 = −9. Your indirect contribution is then negative.
In turn, if you have contributed 40 points to activity A and the other group
member has invested 21 points, then your indirect contribution is positive
and amounts to [40 − 21] ￿ 9
19 =9in this case.
In general the following holds: if your contribution to activity A has
been larger than the contribution of the OTHER group member, then your
indirect contribution to activity B is positive. If you have contributed less
to activity A than the other group member, then your indirect contribution
to activity B is negative. If both members contribute the same amount to
activity A, then your indirect contribution is zero. The indirect contribution
is calculated according to the same formula for both group members.
6. Your total contribution to activity B
The total contribution to activity B is the sum of the direct and the
indirect contribution to activity B:
Total contribution to activity B
= direct contribution + INDIRECT contribution
= (50 - contribution to activity A)
+ (your contribution to activity A minus
the contribution of the OTHER group member to activity A)￿( 9
19)
How many points you contribute eventually to activity B depends not
only on the direct contribution to activity B, but also on how much you have
invested relative to the other group member in activity A. Each of your point
above the contribution of the other group member, increases your INDIR-
ECT contribution to activity B by ( 9
19)-points, while each point below the
contribution of the other group member decreases your INDIRECT contri-
bution by ( 9
19)-points.
At the back of the Table that you have received, the relationships are
summarized schematically. Each point that you invest in activity A increases
your contribution to activity A by 1 point and decreases the direct contri-
bution to B by 1 point. However, this also increases your contribution to
activity A relative to the other group member and therefore also your IN-
DIRECT contribution to B increases by 9
19. Each additional point for
activity A therefore decreases the total contribution to B not by 1
point, but only by 10
19-point.
This is the decisive diﬀerence to the previous experiment. In the previous
experiment, 1 additional point to activity A resulted in a decrease of your
35contribution to activity B by exactly 1 point. In the new experiment, one
additional point for activity A leads to a decrease of the total amount activity
Bb y10
19.
If the other group member increases his contribution to activity A by one
point, your income from activity A increases by 1 point (see the lower part
of the enclosed schematic overview). However, this also leads to a decrease
of your indirect contribution to activity B by 9
19-points since now the other
member contributes relatively more to activity A.
7. Your income from activity B:
The income from activity B is calculated according to the same formula
as previously, namely
Income from activity B = 5￿(total contribution to activity B)
- ( 1
20)￿(total contribution to activity B)2
Recall that the total contribution to activity B equals the direct plus
indirect contribution to activity B.
In the previous experiment, the total contribution to activity B corres-
ponded to the contribution to activity B. Now there is also the indirect
contribution which depends on the contribution of the other group member
to activity A. The only change therefore is in the composition of the total
contribution to activity B, not the formula itself. Therefore, the enclosed
table which you have already used in the previous experiment is
still valid.
Your income from activity B depends therefore on your total contributions
to activity B. As previously, the other group member - in contrast to activity
A - earn nothing from your direct or indirect contribution to activity B.
8. Your total income in a period:
The total income (in points) in a period is
Income from activity A + income from activity B
At the end of the experiment the total incomes of all periods will be added
up and exchanged into Pounds.
36Control questionnaire:
Please answer all questions. Their purpose is only to enhance your un-
derstanding. Please always write down the whole calculation. If you have
questions, please ask us!
1. Each group member is endowed with 50 points. Assume that nobody
(including you) contributes anything to activity A. What is
Your direct contribution to activity B? ..............
Your indirect contribution to activity B? ..............
Your total contribution to activity B? ..............
Your income from activity A? ..............
Your income from activity B? ..............
Your total income in this period? ..............
2. Assume that the other group member contributes nothing to activity
A. You contribute 19 points. What is
Your direct contribution to activity B? ..............
Your indirect contribution to activity B? ..............
Your total contribution to activity B? ..............
Your income from activity A? ..............
Your income from activity B? ..............
Your total income in this period? ..............
3. Each group member is endowed with 50 points. Assume that each group
member (including you) contributes 50 points to activity A. What is
Your direct contribution to activity B? ..............
Your indirect contribution to activity B? ..............
Your total contribution to activity B? ..............
Your income from activity A? ..............
Your income from activity B? ..............
Your total income in this period? ..............
4. Assume that the other group member contributes 50 points to activity
A. You contribute 31 points to activity A. What is
Your direct contribution to activity B? ..............
Your indirect contribution to activity B? ..............
Your total contribution to activity B? ..............
Your income from activity A? ..............
Your income from activity B? ..............
Your total income in this period? ..............
371 additional token by you to activity A
. ↓ &
increases contribution decreases the direct contribution increases the INDIRECT
to activity A by 1 to activity B by 1 contribution to activity B
(your income also by 9
19-token
increases by 1 point) &.
decreases the total contribution to activity B by 10
19-token
{generated income change depends on the level of activity B
-see Table}
If the other group member contributes
an additional token to activity A
.&
increases contribution to decreases your INDIRECT contribution
activity A by 1 and your total contribution to activity B
(increases also your income by 9
19-token
by 1 point) (generated income changes depend on the
level of activity B -see Table)
38Total Your Income Income Total Your Income Income
contribution income change if change if contribution income change if change if
to from activity B activity A to from activity B activity A
activity B activity B increases increases activity B activity B increases increases
by 1 unit by 1 unit by 1 unit by 1 unit by 1 unit
0 0.00 4.95 1.00 26 96.20 2.35 1.00
1 4.95 4.85 1.00 27 98.55 2.25 1.00
2 9.80 4.75 1.00 28 100.80 2.15 1.00
3 14.55 4.65 1.00 29 102.95 2.05 1.00
4 19.20 4.55 1.00 30 105.00 1.95 1.00
5 23.75 4.45 1.00 31 106.95 1.85 1.00
6 28.20 4.35 1.00 32 108.80 1.75 1.00
7 32.55 4.25 1.00 33 110.55 1.65 1.00
8 36.80 4.15 1.00 34 112.20 1.55 1.00
9 40.95 4.05 1.00 35 113.75 1.45 1.00
10 45.00 3.95 1.00 36 115.20 1.35 1.00
11 48.95 3.85 1.00 37 116.55 1.25 1.00
12 52.80 3.75 1.00 38 117.80 1.15 1.00
13 56.55 3.65 1.00 39 118.95 1.05 1.00
14 60.20 3.55 1.00 40 120.00 0.95 1.00
15 63.75 3.45 1.00 41 120.95 0.85 1.00
16 67.20 3.35 1.00 42 121.80 0.75 1.00
17 70.55 3.25 1.00 43 122.55 0.65 1.00
18 73.80 3.15 1.00 44 123.20 0.55 1.00
19 76.95 3.05 1.00 45 123.75 0.45 1.00
20 80.00 2.95 1.00 46 124.20 0.35 1.00
21 82.95 2.85 1.00 47 124.55 0.25 1.00
22 85.80 2.75 1.00 48 124.80 0.15 1.00
23 88.55 2.65 1.00 49 124.95 0.05 1.00
24 91.20 2.55 1.00 50 125.00 -0.05 1.00
25 93.75 2.45 1.00 - - - -
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